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ABSTRACT 
 
In the first part of this essay (Sections I and II), I argue that Kierkegaard’s work helps us to articulate 
and defend two basic requirements on searching for knowledge of one’s own judgements: first, that searching 
for knowledge whether one judges that P requires trying to make a judgement whether P; and second that, 
in an important range of cases, searching for knowledge of one’s own judgements requires attending to how 
one’s acts of judging are performed. In the second part of the essay (Sections III and IV), I consider two 
prima facie problems regarding this conception of searching for knowledge of one’s own judgements. The first 
problem concerns how in general one can coherently try to meet both these requirements at once; the second, 
how in particular one can try to attend to one’s own acts of judging. I show how Kierkegaard's work is 
alive to both these problems, and helps us to see how they can be resolved. 
 
 
 Kierkegaard‟s writings often exhibit a special interest in the injunction to know oneself, 
and in the question of  what it would be to truly heed this injunction. In this essay, I shall 
examine how Kierkegaard conceives of  searching for self-knowledge, concentrating on the case 
of  searching for knowledge of  one's own judgements in particular. I make no assumption that 
Kierkegaard‟s own interest in the topic of  self-knowledge is restricted in this way.1 My aim, 
however, is to show that his writings provide us with a cogent and philosophically fertile account 
of  what is involved in searching for knowledge of  one‟s own judgements in particular. 
I shall approach this aim by reference to two basic claims to which I hope to show 
Kierkegaard is committed and which can be summarized as follows: 
 
(SK1) Searching for knowledge whether one judges that P requires (inter alia) trying to make a judgement 
whether P; and 
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(SK2) For an important range of  cases, searching for knowledge of  one’s own judgements requires (inter 
alia) attending to one's own acts of  judging, how these acts are performed. 
 
In general, we shall see how these claims, SK1 and SK2, are reflected in two corresponding 
perspectives on the search for self-knowledge, both of  which find powerful expression in 
Kierkegaard‟s writings. In the one perspective, searching for self-knowledge properly involves a 
stance that is outward-looking and prospective, as per SK1; in the other perspective, by contrast, 
the appropriate stance for such inquiry is inward-looking and retrospective, as per SK2. 
More particularly, I shall argue that SK1 is a major upshot of  Kierkegaard‟s critique of  a 
purely „aesthetic‟ or contemplative conception of  self-knowledge, especially as this critique is 
developed through his portraits of  aesthetic and ethical life in Either / Or. According to this 
critique, searching for knowledge of  one‟s own judgements cannot merely be a matter of  
contemplation of  one‟s inner mental states; rather, this requires taking responsibility for oneself  
qua finite thinker, beholden to make judgements. Kierkegaard‟s view has an important bearing in 
this regard on current debates about self-knowledge, not least regarding the distinctive character 
of  such knowledge and the role of  deliberation in its acquisition.  
On the other hand, however, and contrary to any impression that trying to „make up 
one‟s mind‟ is all there is to searching for knowledge of  one‟s judgements, I shall also argue that 
Kierkegaard is further committed to SK2. This claim, I submit, is grounded in the way he 
conceives human judgement in general, and ethical and religious judgement in particular. 
Specifically, SK2 is grounded in two important ideas: first, that our acts of  judging are in general 
ultimately based on what I shall call primitive acts of  judging, that is, acts of  judging that are not 
based on further judgements but stand in an immediate and direct relationship to their subject-
matter; and second, that ethical and religious judgements are only properly identifiable as such by 
reference to thinkers‟ primitive acts of  judging. I shall argue that, due to his commitment to 
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these ideas, Kierkegaard thinks searching for knowledge of  one‟s own judgements must in 
general include attending to one‟s own acts of  judging, how these acts are performed.  
  My aim is not only to exhibit the Kierkegaardian credentials of  SK1 and SK2, but also to 
indicate why I think these claims are worthy of  serious consideration. However, I want further to 
consider two prima facie problems regarding the search for self-knowledge, so conceived. First: 
how can one coherently try to meet both requirements at once, given that they appear to pull in 
opposite directions? The challenge here is to make it intelligible how one can search in a way that 
is at once outward-looking and inward-looking, prospective and retrospective. Second: how – in 
what way, by what means – can we attend to our own acts of  judging? The challenge here – I‟ll 
call it the problem of  reflective opacity – is how to bridge the potential gap between one‟s reflectively 
endorsed judgements and one‟s primitive acts of  judging. For the worry arises that, if  one‟s self-
awareness can be mediated by one‟s reflectively endorsed judgements, and if  one‟s reflectively 
endorsed judgements can come adrift from one‟s primitive acts of  judging, trying to attend to 
one‟s primitive acts of  judging in a given case might be like trying to leap over one‟s own shadow.  
We shall see that Kierkegaard regards these problems as real and pressing, but also that 
he provides resources for their resolution. In response to the first problem, regarding the unity 
of  SK1 and SK2, these resources include Kierkegaard‟s striking conception of  'double 
reflection', as a certain kind of  thinking and searching that is jointly constituted by abstract 
reflection and concrete self-examination, together with his rich reflections on Socrates' 
philosophical practice. In considering the second problem, regarding how we can attend to our 
own acts of  judging, I shall introduce an idea I believe is central to Kierkegaard's literary 
practice, and which can be summarized by the following further claim:   
 
(SK3) One can attend to one’s own acts of  judging indirectly, by attending to suitable objects of  comparison. 
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Finally, then, I shall try to show how 'objects of  comparison' might play an important role in 
searching for knowledge of  one's own judgements; and also to indicate why I think this idea 
helps to explain some of  the most characteristic features of  Kierkegaard's work as an author. 
   
I 
 
 What might lead us in general to the idea of  a 'search' for self-knowledge? After all, many 
philosophers are apparently of  the view that knowing one‟s own mind is the default for human 
beings, self-deception a matter of  deviation or aberration.2 Certainly, however, it would be 
implausible to deny that one can be intelligibly enjoined to search for self-knowledge, or that 
there are conditions in which this demand is warranted. And it seems far from obvious that these 
conditions are not in fact quite general and pervasive, given the manifold possibilities of  failure 
in this domain. As Samuel Johnson characteristically put it: 
 
If  it be reasonable to estimate the difficulty of  any enterprise by frequent miscarriages, it 
may justly be concluded that it is not easy for a man to know himself  for wheresoever we 
turn our view, we shall find almost all with whom we converse so nearly as to judge of  
their sentiments, indulging more favourable conceptions of  their own virtue than they 
have been able to impress upon others, and congratulating themselves upon degrees of  
excellence, which their fondest admirers cannot allow them to have attained (Johnson 2003: 
75). 
 
The idea that self-knowledge is hard won and easily lost is no doubt far more plausible in the 
case of  the moral sentiments to which Johnson refers than it would be in the case of  one‟s 
occurent sensations, say (though there are occasions in which one may intelligibly wonder 
whether one‟s sensation is of  a particular kind). But to deny that self-knowledge is always the 
5 
 
 
outcome of  a search is not to deny that there are perfectly familiar conditions in which it makes 
sense to ask about the condition of  one‟s own mind, and to search for an answer.3 
 Now, Kierkegaard's writings are certainly among those that stand opposed to any general 
tendency to regard self-knowledge as default. Thus, according to one, typically sardonic entry 
from his journals, 'hypocrisy is as inseparable from being a man as sliminess from being a fish‟.4 
And it is a striking general feature of  a work like The Sickness Unto Death that the idea of  self-
knowledge is approached via negativa, in terms of  the absence of  certain forms of  self-blindness 
and self-estrangement, a perfected state in which these failures of  self-knowledge have been 
finally „rooted out‟. To know oneself  here is not to deceive oneself, where the possibilities of  
self-deception include the kinds of  wilful refusal to identify with oneself  Kierkegaard calls 
'despair'.   
 If  his work is plainly at odds with any general picture of  self-knowledge as a reflex 
mechanism, this is not to say however that Kierkegaard rejects the very idea of  self-knowledge 
or adopts a deflationary view of  such knowledge. On the contrary, the following characterisation 
of  'the ethical individual' is typical of  his writings in this regard: „the ethical individual is 
transparent to himself  … has seen himself, knows himself, penetrates with consciousness his 
whole concretion‟ (Kierkegaard 1949: 216). And Kierkegaard‟s writings very often invoke the 
Socratic idea of  the ability to distinguish between what one does and what one does not know or 
understand.5 In short, this work is not readily enlisted to the cause of  those who would cast 
doubt on the very idea of  self-knowledge or the ideal of  self-transparency.  
  Given that Kierkegaard is committed to a substantial conception of  self-knowledge, but 
makes no presumption that we generally possess such knowledge by default, it is only natural 
that the question of  how we are to search for self-knowledge should arise in his writings with 
particular force. How then is this search conceived in Kierkegaard‟s works? In the first place, and 
restricting our attention to the case of  searching for knowledge of  one's own judgements, I think 
we may associate these works with the following claim:  
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(SK1) Searching for knowledge whether one judges that P requires (inter alia) trying to make a judgement 
whether P. 
 
To be sure, the notion of  a proposition scarcely has a prominent place in Kierkegaard‟s writings; 
much less do we find there a theory of  propositions. (We do however find references to the 
notion of  'thought-content'.6) But SK1 is not supposed to be tied to any particular conception 
of  a proposition. Indeed, this claim can also be formulated, without mention of  propositions, as 
follows: searching for an answer to the question 'What do I think about Q?', where Q is some 
particular question or issue, requires trying to find an answer to Q itself. But let me introduce 
this claim in a general way, before turning to its place in Kierkegaard. 
The basic motivation for SK1 can be introduced in the form of  a certain response to a 
plausible general constraint on any account of  searching for knowledge of  one's own mind; 
namely, the need to properly take into account the distinctive, and distinctively first-personal, way 
in which such knowledge is typically acquired. According to this response, the first-personal 
character of  my access to what I think about X must be understood by reference to my ability to 
take up the first-personal question what to think about X. Two points immediately lend some 
support to this idea. First, it is often observed that, unlike knowledge of  other things, knowledge 
of  one‟s own mind is typically acquired in an immediate way, i.e. non-evidentially and non-
inferentially, such that claims about one's own judgements and other attitudes have a special 
epistemic status. That is, I don't typically infer what I think on the basis of  my observations 
about my behaviour, and this makes a difference to the epistemic status of  my claims to know 
my own mind. And second, it is also well attested that acquiring self-knowledge cannot merely be 
a matter of  learning to describe oneself  accurately; for there is always the possibility that I truly 
self-ascribe attitudes with which I nonetheless fail to identify („appropriate‟, „own‟, regard as 
mine.) As is familiar from psychoanalytic contexts, it is one thing for me to become aware in a 
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purely explanatory and third-personal way that I am possessed by some belief  or other attitude; 
quite another for me to be reflexively aware of  this attitude as my own. 
These considerations are among those that make it plausible to distinguish between self-
ascription and avowal, and more generally between regarding oneself  as an object and regarding 
oneself  as a subject or agent. Thus, in his important recent book on self-knowledge, Richard 
Moran argues that these differences are crucial to the asymmetry between the first-person and 
the third-person points of  view, and to the idea of  a distinctive mode of  access to one's own 
mental states. Drawing, amongst others, on Sartre and Wittgenstein, Moran writes:    
 
…a report on an attitude of  mine has an explanatory basis, grounded in evidence, and need 
not imply a commitment to the attitude‟s truth or justification, any more than its third-
person equivalent would. Instead, the attribution is made in order to identify the states, 
forces, or whatever else that is driving the actual psychological machinery. An avowal of  
one‟s belief, by contrast, is not made on any psychologically explanatory basis, and is rather 
the expression of  one‟s own present commitment to the truth of  the proposition in 
question … When I avow a belief, I am not treating it as just an empirical fact about me; ...  
it is not something I am assailed by, but rather is mine to maintain or revoke (Moran 2001: 
86-89).  
 
In Moran‟s view, this distinctive character of  avowals, in contrast with reports, reflects the more 
general way in which, as he puts it, „being the person whose mental life is brought to self-
consciousness involves a stance of  agency beyond that of  being an expert witness‟ (Moran 2001: 
4). 
 What then is the place of  these ideas in Kierkegaard? I want to suggest that one of  the 
things we find in his work is a telling critique of  a merely 'aesthetic' approach to self-knowledge, 
and that SK1 is a major upshot of  this critique. One plausible way to read the first part of  Either 
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/ Or, for example, is as a kind of  thought-experiment – in Kierkegaard's own terms, an 
'imaginary construction' – designed to investigate the question: What would it be for a person to 
adopt a wholly aesthetic mode of  self-regard? For Kierkegaard, who evidently relies in this 
connection on a broadly Kantian association between aesthetic contemplation and 
disinterestedness, what is at stake in this question is the idea of  a purely contemplative, 
disinterested, third-personal stance towards oneself.7 Part of  the historical setting here is of  
course the apparent celebration of  just such a purely aesthetic standpoint in the writings of  the 
Jena Romantics. But Kierkegaard wants to know what a fully realized personification of  this 
stance would look like; hence the shadowy, haunting figure of  the 'aesthete' in the first part of  
Either / Or who, for want of  a more familiar name, we come to know as 'A'.8 
 Plausibly, then, the various depictions of  aesthetic life in Either / Or are firmly in the 
subjunctive mood. More: there is arguably a per impossible character to the thought-experiment.9 
Kierkegaard is not in any straight-forward way offering us a life-style option, to be set off  against 
the choice of  a life of  ethical or religious commitment, nor is he trying to describe a genuinely 
traversable stage on life's way. Rather, he is probing the limits and the limitations of  a purely 
speculative or spectatorial stance towards oneself, seeking ultimately to expose what he evidently 
regards as the comic absurdity implicit in the idea that one might 'take up' such a stance whole-
sale. In the section entitled 'Either / Or: An Ecstatic Lecture', for example, the aesthete lets us 
into the secrets of  his ecstatic wisdom: 
  
If  you marry you will regret it; if  you do not marry, you will also regret it; if  you marry or 
if  you do not marry, you will regret both. Laugh at the world‟s follies, you will regret it; 
weep over them, you will also regret it; if  you laugh at the world‟s follies or if  you weep 
over them, you will regret both; whether you laugh at the world‟s follies or you weep over 
them, you will regret both. Believe a girl, you will regret it; if  you do not believe her, you 
will regret it; … This, gentlemen is the sum of  all practical wisdom ... It isn‟t just in single 
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moments that I view everything aeterno modo, as Spinoza says; I am constantly aeterno modo 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 54-55).  
 
All this apparently comes by way of  a satire on the claims made by both the Romantic and 
Hegelian schools of  Kierkegaard‟s day to have achieved an eternal perspective on the whole, and 
to have transcended the disjunctive oppositions internal to our ordinary forms of  understanding. 
But what exactly is exposed as lacking in the practical wisdom of  a bored, ironic aesthete? Not, 
certainly, the capacity for acute, urbane and unflinching self-observation and reflection; on the 
contrary, A‟s papers overspill with philosophically astute and aesthetically witty self-observations. 
And yet for all that he hardly manifests himself  as the model of  a self-knowing agent. In what 
respect, then, does our aesthete lack self-knowledge?  
 Kierkegaard does not leave us without a witness in this regard. What is lacking in the 
aesthete‟s ecstatic self-contemplation is a temporally situated awareness of  himself  as a finite 
agent for whom one's own attitudes are, in Moran‟s phrase, „mine to maintain or revoke‟ – this, at 
least, is the Judge‟s assessment of  his young friend in Part II of  the book. (It is surely significant 
in this regard that the Judge is, well, a judge.) Accordingly, the Judge gives his own gloss on the 
famous inscription at Delphi, as follows:   
 
The phrase gnothi seauton is repeated often enough and one has seen in it the aim of  all 
human striving. Quite right, too, but it is equally certain that it cannot be the goal if  it is 
not also the beginning. The ethical individual knows himself, but this knowledge is not 
mere contemplation, for then the individual would be specified in terms of  his necessity; it 
is a reflection on himself  which is itself  an action, and that is why I have been careful to 
use the expression „to choose oneself ‟ instead of  „to know oneself ‟ (Kierkegaard 1992: 549). 
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According to the Judge, then, what would be lacking in a purely contemplative mode of  self-
regard is an awareness of  oneself  as an agent, and a proper recognition that one‟s judgement is 
called for by questions that matter.10 „What is it, then, that I separate in my either / or?', he 
writes, 'Is it good and evil? No. I simply want to bring you to the point where that choice truly 
acquires meaning for you‟ (Kierkegaard 1992: 485). The Judge's position here is evidently not 
voluntarism, in the sense of  the implausible doctrine that our judgements are under the direct 
control of  our wills; rather, the kind of  choice he urges is the second-order decision to take 
responsibility for a question, and to regard oneself  as beholden to judge one way or the other. 
 These ideas bear comparison with a well-known passage from the writings of  Gareth 
Evans: 
 
[I]n making a self-ascription of  belief, one‟s eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, 
directed outward – upon the world. If  someone asks me “Do you think there is going to 
be a third world war?,” I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward 
phenomena as I would attend to if  I were answering the question “Will there be a third 
world war? (Evans 1982:  61). 
 
Evans‟ point is sometimes put in terms of  „transparency‟; thus, Moran introduces the notion of  a 
„Transparency Condition‟, met by a statement of  one‟s belief  about X just in case it is made on 
the basis of  „consideration of  the facts about X itself ‟ (Moran 2001: 191). Of  course, 
„transparency‟ here is not to be conflated with the notion of  being transparent to oneself  
associated with the 'ethical individual' in Either / Or; what bears comparison with SK1, rather, is 
the idea that whether I think that P is „transparent to‟ the question whether P, in the sense that I 
can intelligibly take up the former question by searching for an answer to the latter. Indeed, what 
SK1 says is that searching for knowledge of  one‟s own judgements requires doing exactly that.11 
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 We should notice where in Kierkegaard the emphasis lies, however; for his accent is on 
the sense in which one‟s properly trying to follow this procedure is itself  an achievement, calling 
for a basic awareness of  oneself  as a finite agent, given to make judgements. Kierkegaard 
evidently believed this kind of  „agent‟s awareness‟ (to borrow Lucy O‟Brien‟s term) was in grave 
danger of  erosion in his day, and not least at the hands of  both Romantic and Rationalist 
philosophers.12 Moreover, pace Moran, whose own emphasis here is on the need to approach 
questions in a 'deliberative spirit', Kierkegaard draws attention to the possibility that regarding 
oneself  merely as a deliberator may fall short of  what is involved in properly regarding oneself  
as a responsible judge. Indeed, at one point in his letters to A, the Judge goes so far as to say that 
„if  deliberation were the task for human beings you would be close to perfection‟, and complains 
it would be characteristic of  his wayward friend to make use of  the deliberative possibilities 
surrounding a question precisely in order to evade it, to avoid letting it matter to him 
(Kierkegaard, 1992: 484).13  
 None of  this of  course is to attribute to Kierkegaard an intention to advance a 
theoretical account, in general and in the abstract, of  what it means to be a responsible judge. 
Rather, he seeks (inter alia) to show what this means by providing portraits of  characters who do, 
and ones who do not, take responsibility for themselves as finite thinkers (more about the 
significance of  this literary strategy later). Nonetheless, I think we can plausibly draw out from 
his portraits of  the aesthete and the Judge a two-fold characterisation of  inquiry about one‟s own 
judgements as properly outward-looking and prospective. Such inquiry is, first, outward-looking in the 
sense that it properly looks not to one's inner psychological states, but to the very content of  the 
question at issue. And, second, such inquiry is prospective in the sense that it seeks not to 
discover something already fixed – that would be for a person to specify himself  „in terms of  his 
necessity‟ – but rather to bring something about. Life must be lived forwards, Kierkegaard 
famously reminds us, and he evidently thinks this includes the life of  responsible judgement.  
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 On the face of  it, these ideas might seem to fit more naturally into a constitutive or 
constructivist as opposed to an epistemic account of  self-knowledge, i.e. some version of  the 
view that so-called „self-knowledge‟ is less a matter of  finding something out about oneself  than 
it is of  making something true about oneself  (cf. Wright 2001). But a note of  caution is in order 
here. For the Judge does not deny that self-knowledge involves contemplation of  oneself, only 
that it can be acquired through „mere contemplation‟ (my emphasis). And we should register that 
Kierkegaard‟s writings do not consistently follow the Judge‟s terminological substitution of  'self-
choice' for 'self-knowledge'.14 In any case, as we shall now see, the idea of  a search for self-
knowledge is far from exhausted in Kierkegaard's view by the idea of  outward-looking, 
prospective inquiry. 
 
II 
 
 Perhaps outward-looking, prospective inquiry is all that is needed in a given case in order 
to search for knowledge of  one‟s own judgements. If  it occurs to me to wonder whether I think 
there will be a third world war, for example, perhaps I should simply try to make up my mind 
about the matter. But Kierkegaard gives us reasons to think this moral is not generalizable, and 
that, in an especially important range of  cases at least, it is a mistake to think trying to meet the 
Transparency Condition is all there is to searching for knowledge of  one‟s own judgements. The 
basic claim here can be summarized as follows: 
 
(SK2) For an important range of  cases, searching for knowledge of  one’s own judgements requires (inter 
alia) attending to one's own acts of  judging, how these acts are performed. 
 
We can introduce the way in which SK1 and SK2 formulate contrasting claims, with the help of  
the standard distinction between an act of  judging and the content of  an act of  judging.15 That is, SK1 
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states a certain requirement on trying to determine the content of  one's own judgements – i.e. for 
some P, whether one judges that P – and SK1 says that this requires trying to make a judgement 
whether P. On the other hand, the import of  SK2 is that there are conditions in which seeking 
knowledge of  one's own judgements requires trying not only to determine the content of  one's 
acts of  judging, but also attending to the character of  these acts as such. Put in one of  
Kierkegaard‟s favourite turns of  phrase, this claim says there are important contexts in which 
searching for self-knowledge requires trying to find out not only what one thinks but also how.16  
This claim, I submit, is grounded in the way Kierkegaard fundamentally conceives human 
judgement in general, and ethical and religious judgement in particular. His views in this regard 
are certainly difficult to untangle from his famous opposition to Hegel, and especially Hegel's 
conception of  'pure thought'. But a useful starting point is provided by Kierkegaard‟s curious if  
often overlooked appeal to the image of  a leap in the context of  discussions, not about religious 
faith, but about logic and judgement. Witness the following from his journals: 
 
Basic principles can be demonstrated only indirectly (negatively). This idea is frequently 
found in Trendlenburg‟s [sic] Logische Untersuchungen. It is significant to me for the leap .... 
By analogy and induction the conclusion can be reached only by a LEAP.   
All other conclusions are essentially tautological (JP 3: 16). 
 
If  all too telegraphic, these notes are of  some significance since, as Ronald Johnson observes, 
they represent Kierkegaard‟s first substantial entry on „the leap‟ (Johnson 1997: 161). Johnson also 
documents the Aristotelian context of  these remarks (via Trendelenburg), and in particular the 
special notion of  „induction‟ in play here, as the kind of  immediate and direct judgement on 
which, on pain of  a vicious regress, Aristotle apparently thinks all demonstrative reasoning must 
ultimately depend. What seems reasonably clear, then, is that Kierkegaard associates the image 
of  a leap in this context with the idea of  acts of  judging that are immediate and direct, that is, 
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not mediated by further judgements; a leap, after all, involves getting from A to B without 
touching any intervening ground.17  
As many places in his writings also attest, however, Kierkegaard‟s interest in the idea that 
our judgements ultimately depend on acts of  judging that are immediate and direct goes far 
beyond any narrow interest in Aristotelian logic. In Philosophical Fragments, for example, it is 
argued that judgements of  the form A exists are brute, in the sense that there can be no non-
question-begging proof  of  such judgements, and that all existential judgements must therefore 
involve „a leap‟ on the part of  the thinker (cf. KW 7: 43). And throughout Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, we find repeated reference to the idea that „reflection can only be stopped by a leap‟, 
where the notion of  a leap is glossed as „something altogether different from the logical‟ and 
associated with an act of  „decision‟ or „resolution‟ on the part of  the finite thinker (cf. KW 12.1: 
113; 115-116; 335-358).18  
We may add, moreover, that the central idea here – the idea that our judgements are 
ultimately based on acts of  judging that are immediate and direct – can indeed be plausibly 
articulated in a quite general way. Consider, for example, the following from David Bell‟s seminal 
essay on Kant‟s Critique of  Judgement (Bell‟s essay is entitled „The Art of  Judgement‟):  
 
If  we are to avoid the incoherence of  a regressive infinity of  acts of  judgement, or 
identification, interpretation, understanding or thought, then at some point we must judge 
immediately, spontaneously – and this means without having already judged, identified, 
understood, or grasped a thought on the basis of  any prior such act. There is simply no 
room here for an irremovable intermediary (Bell 1987: 226).   
 
According to Bell, this simple line of  argument forms the basis of  a serious objection to Frege‟s 
theory of  judgement, but is determinative both for Kant‟s conception of  „the spontaneity of  
thought‟ and for many of  Wittgenstein‟s remarks on rule-following (for example: „if  I have 
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exhausted the justifications [sc. for following a rule in the way I do] I have reached bedrock, and 
my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do” (Wittgenstein 1953: 
§217).19 The argument here is not of  course that we cannot make judgements based on the 
apprehension of  thoughts (or rules); Kierkegaard, for one, clearly recognizes our capacity to take 
up cognitive attitudes towards thoughts (he typically refers to such acts in terms of  „reflection‟ or 
„abstract thinking‟). The argument, rather, is that the judgements of  finite thinkers are ultimately 
based on what I shall call primitive acts of  judging, that is, acts of  judging that do not take thoughts 
as their objects, but on the contrary stand in an immediate and direct relation to what they are 
about.20 
No doubt we have to look elsewhere than Kierkegaard‟s writings for a detailed account 
of  the notion of  a primitive act of  judging.21 But its important place in his thought is manifest in 
his frequently and sharply expressed opposition to any idea that human thinking is essentially 
mediated by hypostasized thoughts. Rightly or wrongly – I think rightly, though I shall not argue 
the point here – Kierkegaard associates just such a conception with Hegel‟s logic of  „pure 
thought-determinations‟; and it is evidently part of  Kierkegaard‟s aim to provide, against Hegel 
and in the spirit of  Hamann, a critique of  the purism of  thought (cf. Watts 2007).22 The 
important point here, however, is the positive outcome of  this critique: namely, that human 
judgement cannot ultimately be severed from human spontaneity, as expressed in our primitive 
acts of  judging.  
 Now, the idea that, contrary to this line of  argument, judgement is essentially mediated 
by abstract thoughts lends support to a certain view of  how a person‟s judgements are in general 
to be identified. On this view, all that is needed in order to identify a person's judgements in any 
given case is some suitable method of  fixing their content. (This of  course allows for a variety of  
answers to the question what is the right method for fixing the content of  thinkers‟ acts (cf. 
Higginbotham and Segal 1994)). That Kierkegaard also rejects this view, in this general and 
unqualified form, is evident from such remarks as the following from Johannes Climacus; 
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If  a two-year old child could be taught a mathematical thesis, it would be essentially just as 
true in the child‟s mouth as in the mouth of  Pythagoras. If  we taught a two-year old child 
to say these words “I believe that there is a God” or “Know yourself,” then no one would 
reflect on those words. Is talent itself  then not the adequate authority? Do not religious 
and ethical truths require something else, or another kind of  authority, or, rather, what we 
do actually call authority, for we do, after all, make a distinction between talent and 
authority? If  someone has enough talent to perceive all the implications in such a thesis, 
enough talent to enunciate it, it does not follow that he himself  believes it or that he 
himself  does it, and insofar as this is not the case, he then changes the thesis from a 
religious to a historical thesis, or from an ethical to a metaphysical thesis (KW 7: 152).   
 
The basic point here, I take it, is that having the right sorts of  cognitive talents may be enough to 
make a person capable of  stating mathematical truths, for example; but that nothing merely of  
this sort could be sufficient to make a person capable of  stating ethical or religious truths as such 
(we shall shortly consider why Kierkegaard thinks this). But we are also introduced here to the 
striking idea that, if  one enunciates a putatively ethical or religious thesis in a way that lacks the 
right sort of  backing or authority, this has consequences for the very identity of  one‟s claim, such 
that it is not the ethical or religious claim it seems to be, and which the very same form of  words 
would indeed serve to express when enunciated in more favourable conditions, but must be 
identified as a claim of  some other type; a historical claim, perhaps, or a metaphysical one.23  
 If  it is on quite general grounds that Kierkegaard denies human judgement is essentially 
mediated by thoughts, it should be clear that it is for more local reasons that he denies thinkers‟ 
judgements can in general be adequately identified solely by reference to thoughts. That is, this 
latter denial is based in his views about ethics and religious judgements in particular; this much is 
clear from the contrast with the mathematical case. So Kierkegaard does not deny that very many 
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of  a person's judgements can be adequately identified by reference to abstract content; what he 
denies, rather, is that this is true of  one's ethical and religious judgements. Even in the cases of  
ethics and religion, moreover, Kierkegaard does not deny that an adequate method of  identifying 
a person‟s judgements will include reference to abstract content; what he denies is that ethical 
and religious judgements can be identified as such solely or primarily in this way.24  
 The following basic commitments help to explain why Kierkegaard treats ethics and 
religion as special cases in this regard: first, that ethical and religious claims have imperative force 
and not, or not merely, assertoric force; second, that such claims make serious demands on one's 
way of  life; and third, that one cannot truly regard a claim as making a serious demand on one's 
way of  life without treating it in an appropriately serious way. This notion of  seriousness – or 
„earnestness‟, as Kierkegaard often calls it – calls for closer scrutiny than I can give it here. But 
these commitments are surely at least intelligible, and help explain why he thinks it only 
appropriate for us to attend to the character of  a person's acts of  judging when we try to identify 
his or her judgements about matters of  ethics and religion. Thus, he writes: 
 
In life, the difference is not what is said, but how ... „How‟ here is not the aesthetic, the 
declamatory, whether in flowery language or simple style, whether with sonorous chords or 
with a screeching voice, whether dry-eyed and unfeeling or tearful, etc. No, the difference 
is whether one speaks or one acts by speaking, whether one simply uses one‟s voice, 
expression, arm movements, a threefold, perhaps fourfold, stress on one word, etc., 
whether one makes of  things like this to exert pressure, to stress a point, or whether to 
exert pressure one uses one‟s life, one‟s existence, every hour of  one‟s day, makes sacrifices, 
etc. The latter is a high pressure that changes what is said into something quite other than 
when a speaker says the same thing verbatim … [There is] an infinite difference in ways of  
putting one's thoughts into the world (Kierkegaard 1996: 474). 
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Plainly, to know „how thinkers puts their thoughts out into the world‟ is not here to have a story 
about the psychological aetiology of  their judgements; rather, it is to know whether their 
judgements are expressed in a way that is glib or serious, second-hand or personally attested. 
Moreover, it appears that whether a person‟s speech-acts are in earnest is for Kierkegaard largely 
a matter of  whether they are backed up by his or her primitive acts of  judging („whether to exert 
pressure one uses one‟s life ...‟). So if  we must attend to thinkers‟ acts of  judging as such, in 
order to identify their judgements about ethics and religion, we must by the same token attend to 
their primitive acts of  judging. In this way, the general notion of  a primitive act of  judging 
dovetails with Kierkegaard‟s specific conception of  ethical and religious judgement. 
How, then, do these ideas about human judgement in general, and ethical and religious 
judgement in particular, bear on the search for self-knowledge? Putting aside special features of  
ethics and religion, there is, I think, a general point to be made here: namely, that in seeking to 
know one‟s own judgements one sort of  thing we might want to find out is how we are already 
oriented in a given context by our primitive acts of  judging. On the one hand, it seems one might 
well want to find this out, given Kierkegaard's view that our judgements are ultimately based on 
such acts. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how a purely outward-looking and prospective 
stance could be equal to this task. We shall return to this general issue in Section IV below. 
 But there is also a more specific point here, and the restriction of  scope in SK2 – to 'an 
important range of  cases' – is intended to pick up the special status of  ethical and religious 
judgements in Kierkegaard‟s view. That is, the requirement specified in this claim is to be 
understood as restricted to those contexts in which he thinks our judgements cannot be 
adequately identified by reference to abstract content alone. Now, if  ethics and religion are 
contexts of  just this sort, a purely content-directed method is presumably no more fit for the 
purpose of  self-ascribing one‟s own judgements about these matters than it is for ascribing such 
judgements to anyone else. Hence the claim that, in these contexts, searching for knowledge of  
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one's own judgements requires attending to their character qua acts, how these acts are 
performed.  
  This claim is made vivid by what Merold Westphal identifies as „the first concrete satire 
of  Postscript‟, in which the denizens of  Danish Christendom regard as anathema a man to whom 
it has occurred that it might not be „quite right for him to call himself  a Christian‟ (cf. Westphal 
1996: 54-55): 
 
If  he were married, his wife would tell him, “Hubby, darling, where did you ever pick up 
such a notion? How can you not be a Christian? You are Danish, aren‟t you? Doesn‟t the 
geography book say that the predominant religion in Denmark is Lutheran-Christian? You 
aren‟t a Jew, are you, or a Mohammedan? What else would you be then? It is a thousand 
years since paganism was superseded; so I know you aren‟t a pagan. Don‟t you tend to your 
work in the office as a good civil servant; aren‟t you a good subject in a Christian nation, in 
a Lutheran-Christian state? So of  course you are a Christian” (KW 12.1: 50-51).  
 
The satirical point here is not, or at least not merely, that the wife bases her judgement that 
hubby is a Christian on insufficient grounds – his having been born into a so-called Christian 
country etc. – but rather that her whole way of  comporting herself  towards the question what it 
is to be a Christian, as captured in the satire, is symptomatic of  her failure to seriously engage 
with this question at all. What Kierkegaard thinks she would need to do, to find this out, is not 
merely to take up outward-looking and prospective deliberations what to think about Christianity, 
but also to attend to how she is already most basically oriented qua thinker in this regard. As 
Kierkegaard will sometimes put it, she needs to recover a „primitive impression‟ of  herself  (cf. JP 
1: 292).   
  It should be clear, then, that Kierkegaard associates special requirements with searching 
for knowledge of  one‟s ethical and religious judgements. But we should also register that it is also 
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clearly part of  his view that this kind of  knowledge, in particular, has a special claim to be called 
self-knowledge, on the grounds that ethical and religious judgements have to do with what he calls 
„the essentially human‟, the meaning of  one‟s life. It is an overriding concern with the essentially 
human, for example, that he associates with Socrates‟ avowed turn away from other things and 
towards himself; away from questions regarding Pegasus and the Gorgons, as he says in the 
Phaedreus, and towards the question 'whether I happen to be some wild animal more multiply 
twisted and filled with desire than Typhon, or a gentler and simpler animal, having by nature a 
share in a certain lot that is divine and without arrogance' (Plato 1998: 94). (As Kierkegaard is 
quick to point out, however, there is a paradoxical aspect to Socrates' attitude here: for in the 
very gesture of  turning away from the mythical beings, he is to be found reflecting on the 
differing natures of  these others. As we shall see below, Kierkegaard's conception of  the search 
for self-knowledge turns out to be decisively shaped by the idea that this search may involve 
others.)  
We may conclude that, for Kierkegaard, searching for knowledge of  one‟s own 
judgements must in general include attending to one‟s own primitive acts of  judging; whether for 
the general reason that our judgements are ultimately based on such acts, or for the specific 
reason that we need to attend to such acts in order to know how we truly judge matters of  ethics 
or religion. So if  Kierkegaard thinks inquiry about one's own judgements is, or ought to be, 
outward-looking and prospective – and we have seen that he does think this – his work also 
affords a contrasting perspective in which such inquiry is properly inward-looking and 
retrospective: inward-looking, insofar as it requires attending to one's own acts of  judging as 
such; and retrospective, insofar as at a given time and in a given context one will find oneself  
already oriented by one‟s primitive acts of  judging, in one way or another. 
 
III 
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I turn now to the first of  two prima facie problems regarding the search for knowledge of  
one's judgements, conceived as subject to the requirements specified in SK1 and SK2. This 
problem can be stated briefly, and arises from the immediately striking fact that these two 
requirements seem to be in some tension; for how could one coherently take up a stance that is 
at once outward-looking and prospective, on the one hand, and inward-looking and retrospective 
on the other? I shall not attempt a full answer to this question here, but I do want to show that 
Kierkegaard‟s thought is at least sensitive to the issue and basically intelligible in this regard. 
 In fact, there is clear evidence that Kierkegaard is not committed to its being possible for 
a thinker to take up a stance that is at once outward-looking and inward-looking, prospective and 
retrospective; at least if  we read this „at once‟ as implying temporal simultaneity. This evidence is 
provided by Kierkegaard‟s conception of  „double-reflection‟, as a distinctive kind of  thinking and 
communication, and as introduced in Postscript as follows: 
 
The reflection of  inwardness is the subjective thinker‟s double-reflection. In thinking, he 
thinks the universal, but, as existing in this thinking, as acquiring this in his inwardness, he 
becomes more and more subjectively isolated …. 
When a thought has gained its proper expression in the word, which is attained through 
the first reflection, there comes the second reflection, which bears upon the intrinsic 
relation of  the communication to the communicator and render‟s the existing 
communicator‟s own relation to the idea (KW 12.1: 73, 76).  
 
Abstracting from the complications introduced by the theme of  communication here, the basic 
idea is this.25 Double-reflection consists of  two, temporally distinct parts: in an anterior moment 
of  reflection, the thinker looks outwards, towards „the universal‟, „the idea‟; then, in a subsequent 
moment of  reflection, inquiry is turned inwards, towards the thinker‟s own relation to the 
content of  the first reflection.26 So, in the context of  our question how in a given case one could 
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coherently try to meet both the requirements we have considered, the notion of  double-
reflection effectively issues the following directive: first try to make a judgement (as per SK1), 
and then attend to yourself  in relation to the content of  the judgement you make (as per SK2)! 
 There is no obvious reason to think this directive is internally inconsistent. But we can 
admit that the formal notion of  double-reflection hardly provides much of  a picture of  what it 
would be for a thinker to take up this kind of  dual stance. Happily, however, Kierkegaard thinks 
that Socrates, for one, provides us with just such a picture, a strange and unsettling picture for 
sure, but a model nonetheless. Thus, according to Kierkegaard's magister dissertation, Socrates' 
philosophical practice is distinguished above all by the way he is able to relentlessly pursue 
abstract questions and problems, whilst continually returning to the concrete matter how he 
himself  stands in relation to the questions and problems at issue (cf. Watts 2010). And 
Kierkegaard‟s general appreciation of  Socrates in this regard comes out nicely in the following 
from his journals: 
 
Take Socrates! He is not a third person in the sense that he avoids getting into danger, 
exposing himself  or risking his life, as one usually does when he is third person, not an I. 
By no means. But in danger he himself  relates objectively to his own person; in the 
moment he himself  is condemned to death he talks about his sentence as if  he were an 
entirely separate third party. He is subjectivity raised to the second power; his relationship 
is one of  objectivity just like that of  a true poet in relation to his poetic production; with 
this objectivity he relates to his own subjectivity. This is no mean achievement. Generally 
we get one of  two things – either an objective something, an objective piece of  furniture 
that is supposed to be a human being, or we get a jumble of  accidental occurrences and 
arbitrariness. But the task is to relate objectively to one's own subjectivity (JP 4: 364). 
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This passage surely gives the lie to any lingering impression of  Kierkegaard as a „subjectivist‟, 
who wanted to give us licence to abandon the pursuit of  objectivity, and give way to „accidental 
occurrences and arbitrariness‟. On the contrary, what he prizes in Socrates is the way he manages 
to occupy an objective perspective on himself  without losing touch with himself  as a finite 
agent, to whom it is given to make judgements (and face the consequences). Certainly, 
Kierkegaard thinks this is no mean achievement, and that this duality in Socrates‟ stance is part 
of  what makes him atopos. But it also appears to be part of  Kierkegaard‟s view that the possibility 
of  „double-reflection‟ is attested for us by its actuality in the life of  Socrates. 
 
IV 
 
 A further problem presents itself, however. As we have seen, Kierkegaard thinks 
searching for knowledge of  one‟s own judgements must in general include attending to one‟s 
own primitive acts of  judging; whether for the general reason that our judgements are ultimately 
based on such acts, or for the specific reason that we need to attend to such acts in order to 
know how we truly judge matters of  ethics or religion. But one might wonder how – in what way, 
by what means – we are supposed to do this. This question has particular force if  we take 
seriously what I shall call the problem of  reflective opacity, where the basic worry here is that we 
reflective thinkers may come to lose touch with our primitive acts of  judging.  
Recall our happy-go-lucky civil servant‟s wife from Postscript. We can suppose that her 
basic stance towards Christianity is to regard it as nonsense: this is what is displayed by her 
primitive acts of  judging in concrete cases, by how she deploys Christian concepts and by what 
sense she makes of  them in the way she lives out her life: to wit, none. But we may further 
suppose that she reflectively endorses Christianity, perhaps vigorously defending arguments for 
the existence of  God or the immortality of  the soul at civil service dinner-parties. The worry 
then is that her basic stance towards Christianity is not first-personally available to her, since her 
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self-awareness is already mediated by her reflectively endorsed judgements and, especially, by her 
reflectively endorsed self-image. Her primitive acts of  judging are, as we might put it, reflectively 
opaque to her. Kierkegaard apparently believed his fellow Copenhageners were suffering, en mass, 
from just this kind of  self-blindness; he called it the monstrous illusion of  Christendom (KW 22: 
41). 
 There is a notable historical dimension to Kierkegaard‟s concern with reflective opacity; 
for he appears to have been exercised more than most by the hyper-reflective character of  
modern times, by what he called our 'passionless but reflective age' (KW 14: 90). The concern 
here is that we moderns have become so reflectively sophisticated that we no longer have any 
primitive awareness of  ourselves as agents, no „primitive impression‟ of  our lives; our so-called 
thoughts and judgements are second-hand, idle, free-floating, existentially rootless: 
 
If  I were to imagine a human being who was brought up in such a manner and lived out 
his life in such a manner that he never got any impression of  himself  but always lived by 
adaptation and comparison – this would be an example of  dishonesty. And this is precisely 
the state of  affairs in modern times. The history of  the generation runs its course, it is 
true, but every single individual should still have his primitive impression of  existence – in 
order to be a human being. And as it is with every human being, so also with every thinker 
– in order to be a thinker (JP 1: 292). 
 
Here, then, is Kierkegaard‟s version of  the Rousseauian anxiety that „as every advance made by 
the human species removes it still farther from its primitive state, the more discoveries we make, 
the more we deprive ourselves of  the means of  making the most important of  all‟ (Rousseau 
1973: 43). To be sure, as Johan Taels has emphasized, Kierkegaard‟s conception of  primitivity is 
not exactly Rousseau‟s; rather, „primitivity‟ here is evidently bound up with Kierkegaard‟s 
conception of  Socratic, doubly-reflected thinking, as jointly constituted by abstract reflection 
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and concrete self-examination (cf. Taels 2003: 57).27 Nonetheless, the idea of  a „primitive 
impression of  existence‟ is evidently part and parcel of  Kierkegaard‟s conception of  fully-
fledged agent‟s awareness; and again the emphasis is on the fragility of  such awareness. What our 
times call for, he says, is a „more primitive thinking‟ (JP 1: 296). 
 But the problem remains: how is this „more primitive thinking‟ possible for us reflective, 
self-interpreting beings (and especially for us moderns)? If  our self-awareness can be mediated 
by our reflectively endorsed judgements, and if  our reflectively endorsed judgements can come 
adrift from our primitive acts of  judging, we seem to face the difficulty that trying to attend to 
one‟s own acts of  judging in a given case might be like trying to leap over one‟s own shadow. 
Kierkegaard apparently thinks the problem of  reflective opacity runs deep.28 But I want 
finally to show how he offers a cogent response to this problem, based on the following claim: 
 
(SK3) One can attend to one’s own acts of  judging indirectly, by attending to suitable objects of  comparison. 
 
Considered as a response to the problem of  reflective opacity, the thinking behind this claim can 
be presented as follows. If  it is possible to recognize one‟s reflectively opaque acts, it must be 
possible to do so spontaneously, that is, non-reflectively. But, second, one thing that can indeed 
serve to elicit the spontaneous recognition of  one's own acts is exposure to some suitable object 
of  comparison. And, third, since it is possible to seek out suitable objects of  comparison, and to 
attend to these as such, this amounts to a coherent way of  searching for self-knowledge even 
under conditions of  reflective opacity. Finally, then, let me briefly spell out this line of  reasoning, 
and indicate why I think it is central to Kierkegaard's literary practice. 
The first step in the proposal is to observe that it would be too quick to infer from the 
supposition that some of  my acts of  judging are reflectively opaque to me that these acts cannot 
be reflexively known or avowed; for not all avowals result from reflection on the content of  an 
avowal and there remains the possibility of  spontaneous (non-reflective) forms of  recognition. The 
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next step is to observe that I might avow my reflectively opaque acts of  judging in just such a 
non-reflective way on the basis of  my exposure to suitable objects of  comparison. An example, 
due to Katherine Ramsland, helps bring this idea into view: 
 
… a man who wanted to take great pains to give the impression that he was “cool and 
detached” was quite vehement when he exclaimed that he “didn't care” about what 
another person said to him. He invested his denials with so much emotion that the 
incongruence goaded the other into yelling out, “I don't care either!”. The same 
incongruence between what was said and how it was said was caught in the response of  
the second man. What the first man could not see when he was actually engaged in it, he 
saw mirrored back to him through another person's portrayal (Ramsland 1987: 333). 
 
Assuming that it does indeed result in a moment of  recognition of  the form “That's like me!”, 
Ramsland‟s story nicely illustrates the possibility of  spontaneous avowal through exposure to a 
suitable object of  comparison. Of  course the term 'object of  comparison' should not mislead us 
here: we are not to suppose Ramsland's protagonist achieves self-awareness through a reflective 
process of  comparing himself  with his interlocutor; rather, he catches himself  in the act, so to 
speak, as a result of  his capacity to immediately regard the other as an object of  comparison, a 
mirror of  himself.29   
We can also usefully observe three inessential features of  Ramsland's example, however. 
First, the happy outcome in her story seems more or less adventitious, intended by neither party. 
But it is not difficult to envisage a case in which one sets out to provide another with a suitable 
object of  comparison. Indeed, it is very plausible that a major part of  Kierkegaard's conception 
of  indirect communication, and a major aim of  his work in general, is the provision of  suitable 
objects of  comparison. Hence Kierkegaard‟s own prolific use of  thought-experiments, 
pseudonymous authors, stories, parables, diaries and the like. And hence also Kierkegaard's 
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abiding interest in the idea of  literary works that perform the function of  mirrors, as illustrated 
for example by his extended discourse on the biblical text which invokes 'the mirror of  the word‟ 
(KW 21: 13ff), or by the Lichtenburg aphorism he used as a motto in Stages on Life's Way: „Such 
works are mirrors: when an ape looks in, no apostle can look out' (KW 11: 8).30 
Second, as Kierkegaard conceives it, communication by means of  objects of  comparison 
is a productive, even poetic activity; a matter of  artistry. Given the aim to elicit awareness of  
reflectively opaque attitudes, one especially important part of  this art is the ability to construct 
paradigm cases which not only exemplify judgements, as specified by propositions, doctrines, 
opinions, hypotheses and the like, but which also serve to make salient concrete ways in which 
thinkers can be basically oriented in judgement. And the pseudonymous character of  many of  
Kierkegaard's writings, inviting the reader to engage different authorial voices, evidently reflects 
his basic aim to portray the first-person perspective in concreto. As he reflects in his journals: 
 
I regard it as my service that by bringing poeticized personalities who say I (my 
pseudonyms) into the centre of  life‟s actuality I have contributed, if  possible, to 
familiarizing the contemporary age again to hearing an I, a personal I speak (not that 
fantastic pure I and its ventriloquism) (JP 1: 302). 
 
As in Ramsland's example, Kierkegaard's fictional authors are often apparently intended to serve 
to mirror back to the reader an incongruous relationship between „the what‟ and „the how‟, 
between the cognitive contents of  our reflectively endorsed judgements and the basic character 
of  our acts of  judging; but in this case, of  course, their doing so is no accident. 
Third, whilst Ramsland's example has two protagonists, we should register the possibility 
of  one's constructing in imagination an object of  comparison for oneself. This possibility is 
suggested, for example, by a striking passage in his journals in which Kierkegaard seems to 
envisage his own literary productivity as a gift that enabled him to become a Socratic teacher to 
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himself: Kierkegaard writes of  a young man „favourably endowed as an Alcibiades‟ who, having 
lost his way in the world, searches in vain for a Socrates among his contemporaries; „Then he 
requested the gods to change him into one‟ (JP 5: 217). Kierkegaard's perception of  his own 
literary works as playing for himself  the role of  maieutic teacher is also reflected in his repeated 
insistence that he has no knowledge of  the meaning of  these works 'except as a reader' (KW 12.1: 
625). 
Finally, we need not suppose the only way for something to serve as a suitable object of  
comparison is, as in Ramsland's example, through a relationship of  likeness or imitation. 
Certainly, mimesis has a central place in Kierkegaard's own communicative practice; this much is 
already indicated by the inclusion of  the word 'mimetic' in the subtitle of  Postscript, for example, 
and by the major part played in many of  his works by such devices as satire, parody, caricature, 
irony and the like. But it is also clear that Kierkegaard makes use of  what we might call inverse 
exemplars, i.e. objects of  comparison designed to elicit self-knowledge through the spontaneous 
recognition of  difference and dissimilarity; the ultra-demanding stance towards religious 
questions exhibited by „Anti-Climacus‟, for one, might be suitable to lead the reader to recognize 
a certain contrast with his or her own basic orientation to such questions.31 
At one point in his Essays, Montaigne remarks that „I find myself  more by chance 
encounters than by searching my judgement‟ (Montaigne 1965: 27); and Ramsland‟s story might 
seem to bear this out. But Kierkegaard‟s work perhaps shows how the truth in this remark is 
nonetheless compatible with the idea of  a search for self-knowledge. At the very least, we can 
say that if  it makes sense to try to provide suitable objects of  comparison for others, it also 
makes sense to look for such provisions; and the possibility of  imaginatively constructing objects 
of  comparison for oneself  gives further content to the idea of  searching in this way. Moreover, 
as Kierkegaard makes clear in his discussion of  'the mirror of  the Word', he thinks the success 
of  an indirect communication is conditional on the recipient‟s ability to attend to objects of  
comparison in the right sort of  way: just as there are ways of  looking at a literal mirror which 
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avoid seeing oneself  in it so one must approach an object of  comparison in the right sort of  way, 
and attend to it appropriately. 'The first requirement', Kierkegaard writes, 'is that you must not 
look at the mirror, observe the mirror, but must see yourself  in the mirror' (KW 21: 25). 
 These points raise many further questions, and I have been able here to provide no more 
than a high-level overview of  how Kierkegaard‟s conceives searching for knowledge of  one‟s 
own judgements.32 I do hope to have shown, however, that the claims to which I have argued 
Kierkegaard is committed – as summarized by SK1, SK2 and SK3 – jointly specify a cogent and 
well-motivated overall account. Still, as Kierkegaard would surely be the first to remind us, it is 
one thing to think about the search for self-knowledge, quite another to take it up.33      
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1 On the contrary, Kierkegaard evidently has a central interest in the general question how one can know 
how one is basically constituted as a subject, whether or not one is living in despair, for example. 
 
2 This sanguine view appears to follow not only from the much-maligned Inner Perception model ― what 
Ryle dubbed „the hallowed paraoptical model‟ of the mind „as a torch that illuminates itself by beams of 
its own light reflected from a mirror in its own insides‟ (Ryle 1949: 39) ― but also from sophisticated 
contemporary theories that purport to show, for example, that the possession of self-knowledge follows 
directly from some basic feature of our rational nature (see, for example, Shoemaker 1994). 
 
3 In is important for what follows that we can distinguish between X is required in order to possess self-
knowledge and X is required in order to search for self-knowledge. Such a distinction is justified given that 
meeting a given requirement on searching for self-knowledge may not be sufficient to possess self-
knowledge; and that the possession of self-knowledge may not require searching for it. 
 
4 Kierkegaard 1967-78, Vol. 2: 425. Hereafter, this translation of Kierkegaard‟s journals and papers is 
cited as “JP”, followed by volume and page number. 
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5 One prominent example is the motto for The Concept of Anxiety: „Socrates still is what he was, the simple 
wise man, because of the peculiar distinction that he expressed both in words and in life, something that 
the eccentric Hamann first reiterated two thousand years later: “For Socrates was great in „that he 
distinguished between what he understood and what he did not understand‟”‟ (Kierkegaard 1978-2000, 
Vol. 8: 3. Hereafter, this translation of Kierkegaard‟s writings is cited as “KW”, followed by volume and 
page number). 
 
6 See, for example, the comment on Either / Or in Postscript: „There is no didacticizing, but this does not 
mean that there is no thought-content‟ (KW 12.1: 254). 
 
7 This association between the aesthetic and disinterestedness is made explicit in the following from 
Postscript: „Poetry and art have been called an anticipation of the eternal. If one wants to call them that, 
one must nevertheless be aware that poetry and art are not essentially related to an existing person, since 
the contemplation of poetry and art, “joy over the beautiful,” is disinterested, and the observer is 
contemplatively outside himself qua existing person‟ (KW 12.1: 313fn). 
 
8 The following from Friedrich Schlegel suffices to indicate the background to Either / Or provided by the 
more programmatic statements of the Jena Romantics: „Romantic poetry is a progressive universal poetry 
… It tries to and should … make poetry lively and sociable, and life and society poetical‟ (Schlegel 
1971:175).  
 
9 Though often missed by commentators, the subjunctive and per impossible character of the portraits in 
Either / Or is forcefully argued in Hartshorne 1990. Tellingly, Kierkegaard remarks in his journals that „it 
may legitimately be said that the subjunctive, which occurs as a glimmer of the individuality of the person 
in question, is a dramatic retort in which the narrator steps aside as it were and makes the remarks as true 
of the individuality (that is, poetically true), not as factually so and not even as if it may be that, but it is presented 
under the illumination of subjectivity‟ (JP 3: 5, my emphasis).  
 
10 That Moran himself uses the gnothi seauton passage from Either / Or as an epigraph for Chapter Four of 
Authority and Estrangement („The Authority of Self-Consciousness‟) suggests he sees the connections here; 
and whilst Moran doesn‟t explore these Kierkegaardian connections it is perhaps significant in this regard 
that Sartre and Wittgenstein, on whose work he does draw extensively, were both readers of Kierkegaard.   
 
11 Jonathan Way presses objections to the idea that meeting the Transparency Condition is sufficient for 
self-knowledge (Way 2007). Note, however, that it is one thing to say, with SK1, that searching for self-
knowledge requires (inter alia) following this procedure, another thing to say that doing so is sufficient for 
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self-knowledge. As I shall argue below, Kierkegaard, for his part, clearly does not think meeting the 
Transparency Condition is sufficient in general for self-knowledge.     
 
12 O‟Brien writes: „we are agent-aware of our actions in virtue of carrying them out as a direct result of 
active consideration of ways we might act‟ (O‟Brien 2007: 120). Kierkegaard writes: „If in our day thinking 
had not become something strange, something second-hand, thinkers would indeed make a totally 
different impression on people, as was the case in Greece, where a thinker was also an ardent existing 
person impassioned by his thinking‟ (KW 12.1: 308). 
 
13 In fairness to Moran, however, he introduces the notion of a „deliberative spirit‟ in a way that casts 
immediate doubt on whether the aesthete‟s spirit is properly characterized as deliberative in his sense; 
thus Moran writes of „the requirement that I address myself in a deliberative spirit, deciding and declaring 
myself on the matter‟ (Moran 2001: 63).    
 
14 In The Sickness Unto Death, for example, we find: „The law for the development of the self with respect 
to knowing, insofar as it is the case that the self becomes itself, is that the increase of knowledge 
corresponds to the increase of self-knowledge; that the more the self knows, the more it knows itself‟ 
(KW 19: 31). 
 
15 The word „judgement‟ is often said to be ambiguous with respect to this distinction. I take it, however, 
that we often use this English word in a more coarse-grained way such that, if we wish to speak here of 
act and content, we must say that since the word connotes both, it does not admit of disambiguation 
between the two. Indeed, this linguistic possibility is exploited in my formulation of SK2; this claim does 
not say that searching for knowledge of one‟s acts of judging requires attending to one‟s acts of judging; 
nor does it say that searching for knowledge of the content of one‟s acts of judging requires attending to 
one‟s acts of judging; what it says is that, in certain cases, searching for knowledge of one‟s judgements 
(coarse-grained use) requires attending (not only to the contents of acts of judging but also) to one‟s acts 
of judging as such. Needless to say, I try not to trade on any ambiguities in this regard.   
 
16 For a general account of Kierkegaard on „the what‟ and „the how‟, see Hannay 2003. 
 
17 This is perhaps why Paul Holmer can attribute the following thesis to Kierkegaard: „There is no proof 
for logical laws or principles ... They describe only the conditions for valid inference; they do not provide 
logical grounds for being logical. Logic is not its own proof‟ (Holmer 1957: 39).  
 
18 On how the notions of „decision‟ and „resolution‟ enter into Kierkegaard‟s thinking about „the leap‟, see 
Ferreira 1991; Johnson 1997; Stokes 2007. 
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19 Cf. Bell 1979; 1987a; 1987b. The following from Wittgenstein‟s Nachlass seems even more redolent, 
against the background of Kierkegaard‟s appeal to the image of a leap in this context: „I see that it is red – 
but how does that help me if I do not know what I have to say or how, in some other way, to give 
expression to my knowledge? For sooner or later I must make the transition to expression. And at this 
transition all rules leave me in the lurch. For now they all really hang in the air. All good advice is of no 
help to me, for in the end I must make a leap. I must say “That is red” or act in some way, which amounts 
to the same thing‟ (MS 129, cited in Baker & Hacker 1985: 148).  
 
20 Compare the way Kierkegaard introduces the notion of concrete thinking (as opposed to „abstract 
thinking‟): „What is concrete thinking? It is thinking where there are a thinker and a specific something (in 
the sense of particularity) that is being thought, where existence gives the existing thinker thought, time 
and space‟ (KW 12.1: 332). 
 
21  One place we might look for elaboration of the notion of a primitive act of judging, for example, is to 
Christopher Peacocke‟s account of the notion of the concepts and transitions that a thinker finds 
„primitively compelling‟ (Peacocke 1992: 6). Another, quite different, place is Heidegger‟s doctoral 
dissertation The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism, in which he rejects any general appeal to the notion that 
the objects of our judgements have „some metaphysical standing‟, existing in a realm distinct from both 
mind and world, on the grounds that „such a metaphysical being is never known with that immediacy with 
which we become aware of the something in question‟ (cited in Martin 2006: 120).    
 
22 The following from Postscript is indicative of this critique: „If Hegel had published his Logic under the 
title “Pure Thinking,” had published it without the author‟s name, without the date, without notes ... it 
would have been treated in the Greek way. That is how a Greek would have done it … Now the Logic 
with all its notes makes an odd impression, just as if a man were to exhibit a letter fallen from heaven and 
then even left the blotting paper lying in it, which would all too clearly indicate that the letter from heaven 
had come into existence on earth‟ (KW 12.1: 332-333).  
 
23 Here, I think, lie the roots of the important Kierkegaardian theme that one can misidentify a person‟s 
judgements by misidentifying the „sphere‟ in which their judgements are made, e.g. by mistaking for the 
expression of a religious judgement an utterance which uses such terms as „God‟ and „faith‟, when really 
these terms are used in an aesthetic way. On this, see Conant 1995. 
 
24 The idea that, in ethics and religion, the „how‟ has primacy over the „what‟ is explicit in Postscript: 
„Objectively the emphasis is on what is said; subjectively the emphasis is on how it is said … Ethically-religiously, the 
emphasis is again on: how. But this is not to be understood as manner, modulation of voice, oral delivery 
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etc., but it is to be understood as the relation of the existing person, in his very existence, to what is said. 
(KW 12.1: 202-203). That he thinks of this as a matter of priority or „emphasis‟, however, shows that 
Kierkegaard does not regard ethical and religious judgements as lacking cognitive content.  
 
25 As Martin Andic has observed, Kierkegaard‟s formulations require a distinction between „double 
reflection as such‟ and „double reflection in communication‟; though the two notions are certainly closely 
related and are often discussed together. See Andic 1999: 24-25. 
 
26 That Kierkegaard thinks of these two moments as sequentially ordered is strongly suggested by the 
tensed constructions in the passage cited („when …through the first reflection … there comes the second 
reflection…). 
 
27 Thanks to an anonymous referee of this journal for pressing me to clarify this point about 
Kierkegaard‟s general conception of primitivity.    
 
28 Arguably, Kierkegaard thinks the problem of reflective opacity runs deeper than I have indicated here, 
and that it is somehow built into the very structure of human selfhood. On this, see Evans (2006); 
Fingarette (2000); Grøn (2003). 
 
29 Compare C. S. Lewis: „Surely what a man does when he is taken off his guard is the best evidence for 
what sort of a man he is? Surely what pops out before the man has time to put on a disguise is the truth? 
If there are rats in a cellar you are most likely to see them if you go in very suddenly‟ (Lewis: 1977: 162).  
 
30 For fine discussions of the mirror metaphor in Kierkegaard, see Piper 1992 and Stokes 2007. On the 
long and venerable tradition which holds that we know ourselves through being mirrored by others: See 
Sorabji 2006: Ch. 13; Bartsch 2006. 
 
31 For Kierkegaard, moreover, the ultimate inverse exemplar is Christ as the paradox or „sign of 
contradiction‟ who reveals the thoughts of many hearts: „A contradiction placed squarely in front of a 
person – if one can get him to look at it – is a mirror; as he is forming a judgement, what dwells within 
him must be disclosed. It is a riddle, but as he is guessing the riddle, what dwells within him is disclosed 
by the way he guesses. The contradiction confronts him with a choice, and as he is choosing, together 
with what he chooses, he himself is disclosed‟ (KW 20: 127).  
 
32 One obvious and important further question is what criteria we have for determining whether or not a 
given object of comparison is a suitable one. For Kierkegaard, at any rate, this question must no doubt be 
answered ultimately by reference to the special authority of „the mirror of the Word‟: '… to see oneself is 
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to die, to die to all illusion and hypocrisy', he writes, 'something that can take place only in the mirror of 
the Word, for otherwise it will become a fraud and one's self-knowledge like the whacks Sancho gave 
himself' (JP 4: 40). 
 
33 I have presented versions of this essay at research seminars in Essex, Dublin, Warwick, Southampton 
and Manchester; my thanks to the participants for very helpful comments. I have especially benefited 
from conversation with Jeff Byrnes, Wayne Martin, David McNeill, Vasilis Politis, Béatrice Han-Pile and 
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc. 
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